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*A Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and Reconstruction
Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S. Proposals and
International Experiences and Related Issues for Congress*

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January 29, 2008

Abstract. In its quest to enhance the U.S. government's capacity to address future conflict settlements, the Bush Administration seeks congressional support for the establishment of a multi-component, civilian "ready reserve" for post-conflict peacebuilding abroad. A Senate bill, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2006 (S. 3322), passed on May 26, 2006, would provide for the continued development of an effective expert civilian response capability for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) activities as a core mission of the State Department and USAID. On June 1, 2006, the Congressional Research Service held a workshop, entitled *Civilian Forces for Stabilization and Reconstruction: U.S. Proposals and International Experience*, in order to clarify the issues involved in forming such a reserve. This report summarizes the main points of workshop proceedings and concludes with a discussion of related issues for Congress.

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A Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and Reconstruction Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S. Proposals and International Experiences and Related Issues for Congress

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Summary

The Bush Administration is expected to submit a proposal for a civilian reserve with the February 2008 budget request. On June 1, 2006, CRS gathered a group of experts on the recruitment and deployment of civilians to peacekeeping operations, now generally referred to by the broader term “stabilization and reconstruction” operations. The purpose of the three-hour workshop was to clarify issues that might be involved in the formation of a civilian reserve force for such operations. The Bush Administration is developing proposals for a civilian reserve. Shortly before the workshop was held, the Senate passed the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2006 (S. 3322) to establish such a civilian reserve.

The workshop began with a presentation by State Department official, Christopher J. Hoh, who explained Administration plans for a civilian reserve. As outlined by Mr. Hoh, these plans called for the creation of a reserve of civilians from the private and public sector to deploy with or soon after permanent government employees and before contractors. Reservists would train together with U.S. military and civilian government personnel before deployments, and would be mobilized as federal employees. They would be provided a range of benefits and incentives.

The workshop included speakers from the U.N. and from two national agencies that recruit civilians for peacekeeping and related missions: the German Center for International Peace Operations (known by its German acronym, ZIF) and Canada’s CANADEM, as well as from the Alexandria, VA-based Institute for Defense Analysis. The U.N., ZIF, and CANADEM all have rosters of professionals in rule of law and civil administration to send on missions. The rosters are not equivalent to the reserve force proposed by the Bush Administration or by a Senate bill (S. 3322), the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2006, but all candidates are pre-screened and provided predeployment training. The recruitment and other problems they have faced may be similar to those that the United States may encounter if it forms a reserve.

Participants pointed to several needs to attract and retain highly qualified people: (1) proactive recruitment methods; (2) in-depth screening; (3) sufficient training; and (4) retention incentives. To meet the needs of requester organizations, participants agreed on the need for (1) sizable rosters, (2) sophisticated databases, and (3) insulation from political pressures. To enhance the prospects for mission success, participants agreed that deployments should be set for at least a year in order to provide continuity. The workshop discussion raised several questions about the desirability of Bush Administration plans. Among the questions are whether recent plans and proposals on roster size and recommendations by a private firm regarding the screening process and deployment length are adequate.

This report will not be updated.

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Contents

Bush Administration Plans	1
Synopsis of Discussion on International Experiences	2
Locating and Retaining the Most Qualified Personnel	3
Recruitment Methods.....	3
Robust Roster.....	4
Screening	5
Training.....	5
Retention and Related Considerations	6
Facilitating Deployment and Mission Success.....	7
Sufficient Deployment Length.....	7
Political Insulation and Continuity	7
Related Issues for Congress.....	7
Roster Size	7
Screening and Training	8
Length of Deployment and Implications for the Reserve Model.....	9
Considerations for the Use of Civilian Reservists vs. Contractors	9

Tables

Table 1. Rosters of Civilian Personnel for International State-Building Missions.....	11
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Contacts

Author Contact Information	13
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<http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL33647>

In its quest to enhance the U.S. government's capacity to address future conflict settlements, the Bush Administration seeks congressional support for the establishment of a multi-component, civilian "ready reserve" for peacebuilding abroad. The Bush Administration is expected to present a concrete proposal for such a reserve in February 2008 with its FY2009 budget request.

In his State of the Union address on January 23, 2007, President Bush invited the 110th Congress to work with the Administration on the design and establishment of a volunteer Civilian Reserve Corps which would function "much like our military reserve." This Corps "would ease the burden on the armed forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them," he stated. "It would give people across America who do not wear the uniform a chance to serve in the defining struggle of our time."

On June 1, 2006, the Congressional Research Service held a workshop, entitled *Civilian Forces for Stabilization and Reconstruction: U.S. Proposals and International Experience*, in order to clarify the issues involved in forming such a reserve. The following report, first issued in 2006, summarizes the main points of workshop proceedings and concludes with a short discussion of related issues for Congress. It will not be updated.¹

Bush Administration Plans

The lead speaker was Christopher J. Hoh, the Director for Response Strategy and Resource Management in the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The Administration has tasked the S/CRS to develop the concept of a civilian reserve force that could rapidly deploy to conflict-torn areas to carry out state-building efforts. This is often referred to as a "surge capability." Personnel in such a force would include rule of law practitioners (police, judges, lawyers, prison administrators), civil administrators and governance experts (people with experience involving local and state government agencies) and infrastructure experts (e.g., civil engineers and planners).

Mr. Hoh explained current State Department plans for a civilian reserve. These plans envision the civilian reserve as a group that would fill the gap between permanent U.S. government employees, who could be deployed immediately, and contractors, who take much longer to deploy. (Permanent government employees would be comprised of two groups, an active force of employees dedicated solely to such operations and a stand-by reserve of government employees who have volunteered to be detailed from their permanent jobs to such operations as needed.)

Civilian reservists would be deployable within 30 to 60 days, mobilized as government employees, paid at a comparable level with government employees doing the same work and offered comparable incentives such as death and dismemberment insurance and diplomatic privileges, according to the Administration plans outlined by Mr. Hoh. They would be chosen for their expertise in the areas needed for "transitional security," rule of law, essential public services,

¹ This issue is tracked in CRS Report RL32862, *Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities*, by Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss. More information on the BearingPoint, Inc. and Institute of Defense Analysis studies, referred to below, may also be found in that report. An edited audio version of this conference is available: CRS Audio Brief MM70096, *Civilian Forces for Stabilization and Reconstruction: U.S. Proposals and International Experience*, <http://www.crs.gov/products/multimedia/MM70096.shtml>.

and civil administration. They would be screened and trained for the capacity to work effectively from the very beginning of their assignment and to function in teams. Because they would be government employees, they would be accountable under U.S. government ethics laws and other regulations and could form part of the U.S. government management structure, e.g., supervising and managing permanent U.S. government employees and contractors. (Mr. Hoh did not provide an estimate of the number of reservists contemplated under current plans. The numbers contemplated by studies prepared for S/CRS are discussed in the “Related Issues for Congress” section, below.)

Noting that the State Department had just received a lengthy report (of well over 600 pages) from BearingPoint, Inc.² outlining detailed plans for a civilian reserve, Mr. Hoh stated that the Administration would consult with Congress on specific plans for the reserve once intra-executive branch consultations are completed. He said that the Administration would consult with Congress on issues regarding specific functional specialty areas (i.e., rule of law, civil administration, economic development), the types of situations in which the reserve should be deployed, and the period of time over which to build a comprehensive reserve force.

Synopsis of Discussion on International Experiences

Subsequent discussion centered on examining the lessons that the United Nations and others have learned in developing their own roster systems to deploy civilians to peace operations. The speaker from the United Nations was Catherine Rolland, Chief of the newly created Recruitment and Outreach Unit of the United Nations (U.N.) Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ (UNDPKO) Personnel Management and Support Service. The Recruitment and Outreach Unit is responsible for the screening of candidates and the maintenance of a roster for U.N. peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.

There were also speakers from the two largest and most sophisticated national roster systems: Jens Behrendt, Head of Recruitment since 2003 at the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin, a recruitment, training and analysis agency established by the German government, and Christine Vincent, Deputy Executive Director and Director of Operations at CANADEM, the Canadian-government funded recruitment and placement agency which she helped establish in 1997.³ (CANADEM is the official name of the agency, even though it appears to be an acronym.) These two agencies are government-established and funded, but independent.

² BearingPoint, Inc. *Management Study for Establishing and Managing a Civilian Reserve*. Prepared for the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. May 30, 2006.

³ Several international organizations and some nations maintain rosters for a variety of purposes. UNDPKO has published a study examining six national peacebuilding rosters (run either by a government entity or a special non-governmental institution), including ZIF and CANADEM and three international non-governmental rosters, as well as the ways in which the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union’s Council and Commission recruit for their missions. (*Lessons Learned Study: Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations*, February 2006, accessible through the UNDPKO website <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons>.) Rosters are also maintained for such purposes as election monitoring and disaster assistance. CANADEM has a division, CAN-Secur, which maintains a roster of security experts to assist in international counterterrorist efforts.

Neither country has a civilian reserve for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations, such as that contemplated by the Bush Administration or by a Senate bill passed shortly before the workshop was held. (The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2006, S. 3322, passed by the Senate on May 26, 2006, but never considered in the House, would have provided for the continued development of an extensive expert civilian response capability for S&R activities as a core mission of the State Department and USAID.) Nevertheless, these two organizations recruit civilians from their respective countries to serve in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations run by international organizations, such as the United Nations, the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Like the United Nations, ZIF and CANADEM pre-screen all candidates and they offer some level of training. (Details on the United Nations, ZIF, and CANADEM rosters can be found in the **Table 1** at the end of this report.) While these agencies are not equivalent to the civilian reserve proposals currently under study in the United States, the recruitment and other problems they face may well have implications for the issues that the United States will confront in forming a civilian reserve.

A fourth speaker knowledgeable about roster systems was Scott R. Feil, a retired U.S. Army Colonel and an adjunct research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), a non-profit institute supporting the Department of Defense. He directed a forthcoming study for S/CRS on civilian post-conflict reserve forces which examined the roster systems of various international organizations and countries, as well as in the United States.⁴ Two other experts with experience in recruiting and screening civilian volunteers for post-conflict missions were invited to participate in the discussion following speakers' presentations: Elizabeth Anderson, Executive Director, and Michael Maya, Principal Deputy Director, of the American Bar Association's Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (CEELI). CEELI deploys lawyers to post-conflict zones and new democracies in the Balkans and elsewhere to help establish or reestablish the rule of law.

Locating and Retaining the Most Qualified Personnel

An underlying premise of the development of civilian rosters and reserves is that the quality of people who are deployed in post-conflict and other stability operations is crucial to their success. Mr. Feil stated that while he does not believe any study has yet been done measuring the effectiveness of personnel in post-conflict missions, he believes that such an evaluation would demonstrate that the more experienced, well-qualified people are more successful at their tasks than those less qualified. Participants discussed their organizations' experiences and methods for obtaining and retaining well-qualified people.

Recruitment Methods

As the purpose of creating a civilian roster is to provide the best possible person for a specific task in a foreign operation and usually within a short period of time, speakers agreed that proactive recruitment is necessary. According to participants, it is not enough to establish an online application website and to develop a roster based on those who apply. Even though many

⁴ Institute for Defense Analysis. *Joint Interagency Evaluation: Manning a Civil Reconstruction and Stabilization Response Capability*. Forthcoming. Prepared for the United States Joint Forces Command, on behalf of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

persons may apply, unsolicited, through an online application link,⁵ many may not be qualified. (Mr. Behrendt estimated that ZIF gets some 50 to 80 applicants a month for placement on the roster, and rejects some 60% to 70% immediately as unsuited to the needs of the requesting organizations.) Ms. Vincent of CANADEM said that targeted recruitment is essential to the development of a roster of well-qualified experts, an assessment in which others concurred. Mr. Behrendt described “head-hunting” as an important task of ZIF’s six recruiters.

One targeted recruitment method cited by CANADEM and ZIF is to build networks in professional communities. For example, CANADEM contacts professional associations in order to build networks. In the future, it may survey its expatriates in business and professional work for potential candidates. ZIF uses networks of Eastern European professionals to work where the Russian language is useful and is also looking to recruit among German Arabic speakers. Another recruitment method is through word-of-mouth contacts with well-qualified individuals: the recruiters request these individuals to recommend others who would be well-suited for such jobs. ZIF representatives talk to corporate leaders in order to persuade them to grant leaves of absence for overseas deployments that would allow qualified individuals to participate in peacebuilding missions. ZIF is also considering recruiting among its expatriate communities.

Robust Roster

Roster size and depth is also an important determinant in an organization or nation’s ability to provide well-qualified people on short notice for specific missions. A sizable roster with some depth in each specialty was recommended by participants. Several participants noted that a large roster was needed, with several people who would be qualified for any one slot. Ms. Vincent stated that a large database increases the chances of being able to deploy a well-qualified person because, in CANADEM’s experience, “really good people are not readily available quickly.” Ms. Rolland stated that it is very difficult to recruit well-qualified people with the requisite language skills.

Whether a roster is of adequate size to fulfill the needs of a particular nation or organization will depend on the number of those sent abroad. For example, CANADEM has drawn the 400 people it currently has abroad from a “core” roster of 4,000. (It considers these the most suited for missions, although its total roster numbers 7,600.) This is a ratio of 10 persons on the core roster to each person deployed. ZIF has a roster of 900 persons and has 200 persons deployed, for a ratio of 4½ to one. (The United Nations, which is making a concerted effort to increase its roster, has a ratio at this time of less than one on the roster to one deployed.)

While sizable rosters are necessary, ZIF has decided to limit its roster to no more than 1,500 people. That, it believes, is the maximum number of participants that it can manage with its six recruitment officers, who also provide continuing points of contact for people deployed in the field and returnees. The purpose of continuing contacts is to provide the support necessary to encourage personnel on the roster to participate in future deployments.

⁵ CANADEM, ZIF, and UNDPKO have online application sites where prospective candidates may apply to join their respective rosters. With exceptions for those experienced in peacekeeping or related missions, prospective ZIF candidates must take the ZIF basic training course, where they are screened before being placed on the roster. (See section in this report on “Training.”)

The ZIF representative also expressed concern that the lack of entry level positions was cutting off a potential source of roster recruits. Because Germany's domestic labor market is tight, ZIF receives a large number of applications from junior professionals. However, entry level positions in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations are quickly disappearing and the greatest demand is for mature, mid-career professionals. Thus, bringing people in at an entry level and having them develop expertise on the job is difficult. Because ZIF and the other organizations usually limit their rosters to those with overseas experience, they may face a shortage of qualified professionals when current members begin to retire.

Screening

Participants stressed the need to employ multiple layers of screening in order to ensure that only applicants who are well suited to the extraordinary demands and rigors of peacekeeping and related missions are placed on rosters. Such missions demand people who are not only experts in their fields, but who also have the interpersonal skills necessary to develop rapidly productive working relationships with people from varied cultural backgrounds. (Screening includes references checks and personal interviews, and in the case of ZIF, testing in a hostile environment (see below). See the **Table 1** at the end of this report for details on CANADEM, ZIF, and U.N. screening processes.) Screening is used to identify those who seek and are well-qualified for the professional challenge that such positions entail, weeding out those merely looking for adventure or seeking to escape troubled personal lives. Even those recruited directly by an organization because of their expertise must be screened for their ability to withstand the physically demanding environments and psychologically taxing situations presented by such missions. People who are not fit for such missions can pose unnecessary risks to themselves, their colleagues, and others.

Not only is intensive screening cited as important in mitigating the risks involved in sending unsuitable people to missions, but it is also necessary to ensure that personnel are able to fulfill their commitments. One speaker noted that two deployed persons had returned from missions in Sudan and the rural areas of Sierra Leone because they were unable to tolerate the situations.

The speakers from the United Nations and CANADEM stated that their organizations are currently enhancing their screening efforts. Part of the improved U.N. screening system will enable potential applicants to make better decisions about whether they are suitable for a position by providing greater online information about the circumstances and requirements of a mission as part of the application information. The United Nations is also beginning to use technical experts to screen applications before applicants are included in the roster. CANADEM has also begun to establish a system to assess the performance of those it deploys in order to evaluate them for future deployments.

Mr. Behrendt of ZIF stated that he thought it important to personally know each person on the ZIF roster. Ms. Vincent of CANADEM said that she knew everyone on the CANADEM roster when it listed 2,000 names, but knowing everyone personally was impossible when the roster grew far beyond that.

Training

The United Nations, ZIF, and CANADEM all offer some level of training to those going on missions. The U.N. training is generally provided in the field at the site of the mission. ZIF has

the most extensive initial training, which it also uses as a screening mechanism in its recruitment process. ZIF applicants are required to take a two-week training program, of which four days are spent at a German Army base that requires them to work with police and military personnel. There, they are put through stressful situations that simulate a hostile environment. For instance, applicants must deal with passing through legal checkpoints and encountering illegal checkpoints. They must demonstrate that they can adapt to the sound of weapons fire. During their training ZIF observes whether they have the interpersonal skills and the capacity needed to deal with stress in a difficult mission. CANADEM views it as essential to provide training courses to those without any international experience. Those who have served in previous missions, however, are given predeployment briefings tailored specifically to their new mission. CANADEM is exploring the possibility of increasing the training it offers, and is considering online training.

Retention and Related Considerations

The discussion revealed some ambiguity regarding the extent to which participation in a peacekeeping/peacebuilding roster should be treated as a career path. The United Nations, CANADEM and ZIF representatives all felt that their organizations are in competition for qualified personnel with organizations that offer a career track in related areas, with benefits and incentives. Such competitors include the United National Development Program (UNDP) and other international or non-profit development agencies. This is especially true in cases where participants must quit their jobs in order to deploy. ZIF said that virtually all of those that it deploys must leave their jobs, while in the case of CANADEM this is less true as the Canadian government is disposed to granting leaves of absence for such experiences. Where leaves of absence are not available, participants are likely to extend their commitments or seek another position after their first assignment ends, making a *de facto* career of a patchwork of overseas deployments. Because of this competition, benefits such as health insurance and life insurance can be important recruitment assets. While Ms. Rolland judges the UNDPKO to have attractive benefits in this respect, CANADEM and ZIF are trying to secure higher benefits for those they send on missions.

Follow-up work with those deployed and their families is necessary in order to encourage people to volunteer for future missions, according to Ms. Vincent. The psychological stress of missions on the deployed person and of the deployed person's absence on the family makes "reintegration work" necessary to retain people for second tours, others also observed.

On the other hand, the speakers also cautioned against repeated redeployments to hostile situations, noting that working in abnormal situations can extract a psychological toll that is damaging for many people over the long run. The ZIF representative cautioned that at times roster participants showing signs of psychological fatigue had to be dissuaded from seeking an immediate new post-conflict posting after completing an assignment. While ZIF seeks a long-term relationship with the people on its roster, with people deploying to multiple assignments over a period of many years, it seeks to discourage applicants from viewing peacebuilding as a career or even as a source of employment for long periods of time, such as ten continuous years.

Facilitating Deployment and Mission Success

Sufficient Deployment Length

According to the workshop discussion, determining the appropriate length for a deployment is critical. Even the best people are unlikely to be successful if their deployments are not long enough to build the relationships needed to perform a job adequately. In addition, much time is lost with shorter tours of duty as successive experts duplicate work which was done by a previous person. U.N. contracts are for six months, the length of the standard mission mandate, but are renewable as the missions are generally extended. Mr. Hoh of S/CRS stated that results improved during his tour in Bosnia as the lengths of time for which civilians were retained increased. Ms. Anderson of the ABA commented during discussions that the ABA asks for an initial commitment of one year and offers incentives for a person to remain for another year. Where that is not possible, the ABA tries to arrange for an overlap in order to eliminate duplication of effort.

Political Insulation and Continuity

CANADEM and ZIF were both established by and continue to be funded by their respective governments, but both exist as autonomous non-profit organizations. Such arrangements are desirable, according to participants, because they allow the organizations to protect themselves from possible political demands, such as lobbying on behalf of the nominations or appointments of individuals for desirable posts. It also makes them less bureaucratic and able to respond more rapidly, according to the workshop discussion. In addition, CANADEM and ZIF enjoy continuity of managers and personnel, which would not be possible if they were government agencies whose personnel were secured by political appointments or diplomatic rotations.

Related Issues for Congress

The major points emerging from the workshop raise questions of Congressional interest about the appropriate size, screening, and resourcing of a potential civilian reserve, and additional authorities needed. These questions are especially relevant when compared with the recommendations made by the S/CRS-commissioned BearingPoint study mentioned by Mr. Hoh.

Roster Size

The workshop discussion squares with two conclusions of the BearingPoint study: first, that decisions on roster size must evolve over time, and second, that the S/CRS planned roster of 3,000 (according to the study) “is a fraction of what will ultimately be needed to fulfill the program’s mission.”⁶ The entire roster would be deployed if reservists were sent to two large and one small operations, according to BearingPoint estimates of the size of operations. The ratio could be as high as five persons on the roster to one person deployed if reservists were deployed to one small operation or during a year of small operations.⁷

⁶ *BearingPoint*, op.cit. p. 4-36. As mentioned earlier, the speaker from S/CRS did not mention a proposed number for the civilian reserve roster. S. 3322 does not set a definite size for the reserve roster.

⁷ The BearingPoint study quantifies deployment sizes in “deployment years.” About 600 reservists would be deployed (continued...)

Workshop discussion indicated that the BearingPoint ratio, which is about the same as the ZIF ratio and about half of the CANADEM ratio for its core roster, might well be workable for a small operation but problematic for larger and multiple operations. The BearingPoint study states that S/CRS will need to closely track deployment refusal rates as one determinant of optimal roster size.⁸

The IDA study contemplates a rule of law reserve of 6,000 people, including police units and judicial teams, and a civilian response corps of 2,500 in other specialities, according to Mr. Feil. In developing its concept, the IDA study looked not only at international rosters, including ZIF and CANADEM, but also several domestic models that are used for a variety of purposes. One that Mr. Feil pointed to as working well is the large online roster of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, with some 75,000 firefighters available for national emergencies. Mr. Feil spoke highly of another as a possible model for a U.S. civilian reserve—one built on the concept of “directed overstrength” in local agencies, where U.S. government provides funding for or reimburses positions in non-federal agencies whose occupants could be called up when needed for deployments abroad.⁹

Screening and Training

The emphasis placed by participants on the need to screen personnel, with special observation of their reaction to stress, raises the question as to whether the ZIF model might be more appropriate than the less extensive Bearing Point model. As noted earlier, ZIF screens applicants extensively, placing potential reservists on its roster only after they have successfully completed a training exercise that places them in stressful situations. The Bearing Point model recommends a written exam for applicants as a first screening step and an in-person evaluation relying on multiple screening methods. The BearingPoint model calls for four to six training events while reservists are in service: “baseline training, orientation, annual training, pre-deployment readiness, leadership training and in-country training.”¹⁰ One question is whether baseline training should be

(...continued)

in a small deployment year, about 900 in a medium deployment year, and about 1,200 in a large deployment year. *BearingPoint*, op.cit., p. 10.

⁸ Because U.S. reservists, unlike ZIF and CANADEM rosters, would be under a legal obligation to appear barring sufficient cause, a U.S. civilian reserve system might well have a lower refusal rate. Still, noting the CANADEM judgment that very good people cannot deploy rapidly, a Reserve may not attract the quality of people that it wants if refusal criteria were too stringent.

⁹ The example mentioned by Mr. Feil as working well is the Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue Team, part of the Fairfax County, Virginia, Fire and Rescue Department. According to its website, the 200-member team of career and volunteer personnel includes emergency managers and planners, firefighters, physicians and paramedics, and specialists in structural engineering, heavy rigging, canine and technical search, and other areas. Team members are available for deployment on 14-day missions in the United States and abroad to provide planning and rescue services for victims of collapsed structures resulting from disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes or man-made catastrophes. When team members are activated, Fairfax County is reimbursed for their services by a federal agency: either FEMA for domestic deployments or the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) for international deployments. (USAID/OFDA also provides the team annual funding to maintain readiness.) Team members are required to attend training every month. A Family Support Services Team provides orientation and assistance to the families of team members. (See <http://www.vatf1.org>.) Mr. Feil stated that some object to this model as too complex for the larger reserve contemplated here and discussed a possible alternative model, in which members of a federal reserve would be seconded to local jurisdictions until needed for deployments abroad.

¹⁰ *BearingPoint*, op.cit. p. 7. BearingPoint lists UNDPKO, CANADEM, and ZIF as among the organizations that were interviewed for its study.

made part of the screening process, before applicants are actually accepted into the reserve. The workshop discussion indicates that the most extensive training recommended by BearingPoint may well be desirable.

Length of Deployment and Implications for the Reserve Model

There seemed to be a consensus that the longer deployments of a year or more are better than shorter ones. The BearingPoint study contemplates a standard maximum deployment length of one year in the field for most U.S. civilian reservists, with provisions for renewals. BearingPoint found that most participants in its focus groups would be willing to join a civilian reserve that required a commitment to deploy on one tour for a maximum of twelve months over a four year contractual period, although some were also interested in the possibility of extending tours and of additional deployments. The BearingPoint study states that “the experience of comparative organizations indicates that six months to one year as a standard tour length adequately satisfies the requirement for continuity of operations and the [critical] relationship building with local and partner organizations.”¹¹ (BearingPoint did recommend shorter three-to-six-month standard deployment commitments for law enforcement personnel, particularly constabulary police, because “performance can erode” over time in high threat environments.¹²)

A one-year deployment length is consistent with current Administration thinking, which views the civilian reserve as an add-on to the force of permanent employees that fill the gap before contractors can be mobilized. Nevertheless, and despite the BearingPoint assessment that most potential reservists would be unwilling to sign on for longer than a one-year tour, the workshop speakers stress that the need for continuity of personnel may argue for a somewhat altered version of the model.

One-year deployments may be adequate for most people in specialties where relationships are not crucial to success, such as infrastructure engineers and other more technical experts. Longer deployments may be considered, however, for positions and specialties where long-term personal relationships and mentoring are important for a successful outcome. Ms. Andersen of the ABA indicated that in rule of law areas involving the courts and rule of law reform, where relationships are crucial to success, tours of one year or more are desirable. (She noted that about one-half of those deployed on ABA missions volunteer for a second year.) Longer deployments may especially be needed when civilian reservists serve as managers or supervisors, as is contemplated by the proposal to activate them as federal employees. Further studies which test for the willingness of potential reservists in different specialties and at different levels of experience and pay to deploy for longer periods may be useful.

Considerations for the Use of Civilian Reservists vs. Contractors

Workshop discussion raises questions regarding the appropriate use of contractors. For the most part, CANADEM and ZIF rosters are not government employees. Representatives from both organizations noted their consequent lack of control over deployed rosters as occasionally problematic and one of the factors that make extensive screening necessary.

¹¹ *BearingPoint*, op.cit., p. 5-41.

¹² *BearingPoint*, op.cit., pp. 5-41-5-42.

According to the current civilian S&R deployment concept for the United States outlined by Mr. Hoh, federalized reservists would be deployed to cover the time “gap” before contractors could be deployed. Because the U.S. government similarly lacks control over contractors operating abroad on its behalf, policymakers may wish to consider whether the only factor to consider in choosing civilian reservists over contractors is relative deployment times. Reservists might be considered in circumstances where hostilities persist over a long period of time or where U.S. interests are particularly sensitive. Alternately, because deploying reservists for greater lengths of time would have implications for the size of the civilian reserve force, policymakers may wish to consider greater controls over deployed contractors and greater oversight over contractor rosters.

<http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL33647>

Table I. Rosters of Civilian Personnel for International State-Building Missions

Country/ Organization/ Year Established	Number Enrolled on Roster	Number Participating in Missions	Types of Personnel	Types of Screening and Training	Annual Cost, Staffing, and Funding Source
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 1994	“Nucleus” database contains 4,000 candidates who have passed a two- stage clearance process. A newly established process includes two additional levels of clearance.	5,130	External personnel recruited for U.N. missions (referred to as “mission appointees”); U.N. headquarters staff on mission detail; personnel from other U.N. agencies on mission assignment.	Candidates are first checked for minimum requirements, then for suitability for a position. Final selection by field mission officials. Training offered in the field and at U.N. headquarters.	“Nucleus” database manned by 9 full-time recruitment officers. Funded by Member States through annual budget.
Germany Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) 2002	800	200 serving in U.N., Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and European Union (EU) missions.	German civil servants and private sector professionals.	To join roster, candidates complete a two-week basic training course, during which they are screened, or demonstrate equivalent training and experience. No specific pre-deployment training offered yet.	Annual budget of \$2.2 million for personnel, training, research, publications, events. 20 full-time staff, of which 6 are recruiters. Funded by Germany’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Country/ Organization/ Year Established	Number Enrolled on Roster	Number Participating in Missions	Types of Personnel	Types of Screening and Training	Annual Cost, Staffing, and Funding Source
Canada CANADEM (Non-profit organization founded with Canadian government funds) 1997	7,564 (core of 4,000 experts). Includes sectoral rosters in human rights, development and humanitarian aid (approx. 1,000); elections (approx. 700); policing (apprx. 600); and security & counterterrorism (approx. 250).	Over 400 deployed in FY2005-2006 to various U.N. missions, and missions conducted by OSCE and other multilateral organizations, and by non-governmental organizations.	Canadian private sector professionals, and civil servants on sabbatical or taking a leave of absence.	Candidates' applications are pre-screened (paper reviews) before being placed on roster. Prior to submission to agencies, expert consultants provide further screening. Most candidates are also interviewed in person or by phone; past colleagues, supervisors and subordinates may be contacted. No initial or pre-deployment training for those hired directly by external agencies as all have experience in international missions. Canada provides predeployment training for those it deploys.	Annual budget of \$500,000. 7 full-time and 5 part-time staff. Funded by Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs

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Notes: Private sector professionals can include applicants from both for-profit and non-profit organizations. Budget figures do not include deployment expenses.

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